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CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS
Darian M. Ibrahim
Entrepreneurs can now “crowdfund,” or sell securities
to unaccredited investors over the Internet, to raise
capital. But will these companies be able to attract the
follow-on investors (angels and venture capitalists) that
are necessary for long-term success? Angels and VCs face
extreme levels of information asymmetry when deciding
whether to fund a company. Signals can reduce this
asymmetry. Early commentary argues a company only
crowdfunds as a last resort for fear of sending a negative
signal about the company’s quality to follow-on
investors. This Article argues the inverse. This Article
argues a successful crowdfunding campaign can send a
positive signal of a company’s quality to angels and VCs.
As this Article explains, crowdfunding can be a savvy
move for entrepreneurs for both social and financial
reasons. Crowdfunding, perhaps more than any other
strategy, shows real-world demand for a company’s
product or service. For this and other reasons explored
in the Article, crowdfunding sends a positive signal of
firm quality, and thus should not disadvantage
entrepreneurs without wealth or connections who
depend on crowdfunding to raise funds. The Article also
posits that crowdfunding signals may reduce the need
for crowdfunding disclosures, thus making the process
more affordable to entrepreneurs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is the hot new method by which new companies
can raise their first capital.1 Selling unregistered securities over the
Internet was prohibited in the past because it constituted a “general
solicitation” of investors.2 In short, entrepreneurs could only solicit
investments from those previously known to them. Then came the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act), which
allowed general solicitation of “accredited” (i.e., wealthy) investors
in so-called Title II offerings.3 It was not until October 2015 that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the final rules
implementing Title III of the JOBS Act, dubbed “Regulation
Crowdfunding” (Regulation CF), which allowed general
solicitation—and thus Internet sales—to unaccredited investors.4
While companies primarily crowdfund to raise capital, this
Article reveals that a crowdfunding campaign serves important,
ancillary purposes. Just as patents primarily allocate rights and
rents while secondarily sending “signals” about firm quality and
productivity,5 crowdfunding campaigns serve the same dual
1 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV.
561, 569 (2015) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding] (“In equity crowdfunding,
investors contribute money” over the internet “in exchange for a tangible interest in the
venture they are funding. . . .”).
2 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2017). Rule 504 allows general solicitation, but issuers must
comply with potentially burdensome state law requirements. See C. Steven Bradford,
Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an Unconditional
Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 33 (2001) [hereinafter Bradford, Rule 504]
(“[S]tates remain free to regulate offerings that Rule 504 exempts from the federal
registration requirements.”).
3 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313
(2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)) (instructing the SEC to remove the
“prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising” under Rule 506 for sales to
accredited investors). An “accredited investor” under the securities laws means the investor
has over $1 million in net worth, or income over $200,000 in each of the last two years (or
$300,000 with spouse) and reasonably expects to reach the same income level in the current
year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017).
4 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 301–05, 126
Stat. at 315-23; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (noting that investors making less than
$100,000 annually can invest up to $2,000, or 5% of annual income or net worth while
investors making over $100,000 annually can invest up to 10% of annual income or net
worth).
5 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637 (2002) (arguing that
viewing patents as a tradeoff between rents and rights likewise “presents an incomplete

200

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:197

functions for new companies. Signals serve to inform potential
investors about a company’s quality when that quality is otherwise
difficult to observe.6 Thus, despite early commentary predicting
that crowdfunding will be an option of last resort for entrepreneurs,7
a successful crowdfunding campaign can actually send a positive
signal about firm quality to follow-on investors, namely angels and
venture capitalists (VCs).8
Some companies that crowdfund may not seek follow-on
investors, instead being content to exist as so-called “lifestyle”
companies run for the benefit of the entrepreneur and the
entrepreneur’s family.9 Early companies who have conducted
crowdfunding campaigns have been in the food, beverage, and other
consumer products industries and do not fit the technicallyinnovative mold of Apple or Tesla.10 However, rapid-growth
companies that go on to seek angel or VC investment11 have also
picture of the value and function of patents”); id. (exploring “the value of patents as
informational mechanisms”).
6 See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
7 See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part III.C.
9 Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 111–12 (“A startup company is a new
venture with an innovative product or business model that targets rapid growth. This
definition distinguishes startup companies from ‘livelihood businesses,’ which generate
income for the company founders and employees, but lack significant prospects for generating
large returns to outside investors through an initial public offering of stock (‘IPO’), or by being
acquired.” (quoting John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting,
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 862 (2005)).
10 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1506
(2017) (“[P]erhaps [startups that crowdfund] are not the type of companies that will attract
angels or VCs at all.”); see, e.g., Invest in Native American Natural Foods: Buffalo Based Meat
and Fruit Bars Based on the Wasna Tradition of the Lakota, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/tankabar (last visited Oct. 19, 2018); Invest in San Francisco East Bay
Brewing Inc.: Bringing San Francisco Craft Beer to Untapped Asian Markets, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/sfebb (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
11 There may be distinctions to draw between crowdfunding companies that later seek
angel as opposed to VC financing. Because angels have non-financial as well as profit motives
for investing, they are less likely to be concerned with some of the problems discussed infra,
such as an unwieldy capitalization table, that VCs will care about. See Darian M. Ibrahim,
The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1439 (2008)
[hereinafter Ibrahim, Angel Investors] (“[A]ngels also have nonfinancial reasons for investing.
A distinguishing characteristic of angel investment is that angels ‘usually develop an
emotional attachment to the business venture.’”).
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first looked to the crowd. Both tech12 and non-tech companies13 are
trying to raise money through crowdfunding. For growth companies,
attracting follow-on investment is the key to success.14 Virtualreality pioneer Oculus is a notable success.15 Oculus began with a
successful crowdfunding campaign on Kickstarter,16 raised $16

12 For example, Zenefits (a human resources software firm) got early funding through
WeFunder and later received funding from Fidelity, Andressen Horowitz, and Venrock. See
Alex Patriquin, Zenefits $500m Series B Nets 4,000% Unrealized Return to Wefunder
Investors, WEFUNDER (June 3, 2014), https://wefunder.com/post/44-zenefits-delivers-over-4000-unrealized-return-to-wefunder-investors; Jeremy Quittner, How This $4.5 Billion
Benefits Startup Plans to Maintain Its Dominance, INC. (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/zenefits-top-ranking-unicorn-for-2015-must-keepinnovating-to-win.html; Geoff Weiss, Zenefits, a 2-Year Old Startup, Is Now Valued at $4.5
Billion, ENTREPRENEUR (May 6, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/245937.
However, Zenefits got caught up in a scandal over whether its agents were selling insurance
without a license (among other improper behavior), and its valuation fell from $4.5 billion to
$2 billion. See Heather Somerville, Software Startup Zenefits Changes Course Under New
CEO, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zenefitsbroker/software-startup-zenefits-changes-course-under-new-ceo-idUSKCN1BW1NS; Claire
Suddath & Eric Newcomer, Zenefits Was the Perfect Startup. Then It Self-Disrupted: What
Happened When an HR Firm Had Some Epic HR Problems., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(May 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-zenefits/.
13 See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 578 (describing the Title II site
CircleUp, which “does not raise money for tech-based companies, instead focusing on
consumer products companies, but, importantly, it still caters to growth startups as opposed
to lifestyle firms” (citing Lora Kolodny, Collaborative Fund, CircleUp Partner To Invest $4
Million in B Corps, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/venture capital/2014/08/18/collaborative-fmd-circleup-partner-to-invest4-million-n-b-corps)); id. (“As CircleUp’s co-founder explains, ‘[w]e don’t have any companies
on the site who are looking at it as a lifestyle business,’ noting that ‘typically these companies
will exit to a private equity fund or strategic acquisition.’” (quoting Christine LagorioChafkin, CircleUp Draws More Investors as Equity Crowdfunding Gains Ground, INC. (Mar.
26, 2014), http://www.inc.com/chrstine-lagorio/circleup-bright-spot-crowdfunding.html))
(alteration in original).
14 See Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1411 (discussing work by Paul Gompers
and Josh Lerner that “found that ninety percent of start-ups that were unable to attract
venture capital within the first three years failed, while the failure rate dropped to thirtythree percent for those that did attract venture capital”) (citation omitted).
15 See, e.g., OCULUS, https://www.oculus.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
16 Kickstarter crowdfunding is different than the crowdfunding discussed in this Article
in that it does not involve the sale of securities. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra
note 1, at 568-569 (distinguishing broadly between equity and non-equity crowdfunding).
However, for signaling purposes, this legal distinction may hold little relevance. Although it
would affect this Article’s sub-arguments regarding capitalization tables, potential lawsuits,
and the like. See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text.
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million from VCs after the crowdfunding campaign, and was sold to
Facebook for $2 billion.17
In this Article, I apply the economic literature on signaling to
crowdfunding and show that an entrepreneur’s decision to
crowdfund—if that crowdfunding campaign is successful18—can
send a better signal of firm quality to angels and VCs than precrowdfunding signals. Because it adds a signaling function on top of
the capital-raising function, crowdfunding can send a better signal
for success than “friends-and-family” money.19
In an environment rife with information asymmetry, signaling
takes on added importance.20 Although crowdfunding is still in its
infancy, early commentators predict that it is destined for failure.21
Those commentators suggest that crowdfunding, to the extent it
signals anything, signals a weak company.22 Companies that
crowdfund, the argument goes, are being shunned by the traditional
sources of entrepreneurial finance—early-stage angels, VCs, even
friends and family—and opt to crowdfund only as a means of last
resort.23 In short, these companies are the lemons of the startup
world that have little staying power and little chance to become
household names.
Arguing the opposite, this Article contends that crowdfunding
can be viewed as a positive, rather a negative signal—and, in
important respects, is a better alternative than other means of early
financing, most notably friends-and-family money. As explained in
this Article, crowdfunding can be a savvy move for entrepreneurs
for social and financial reasons.24 Crowdfunding also does more
than perhaps any other move an early-stage company can make to
17 See Jack Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543,
548–550 (2017) (discussing the Oculus trajectory).
18 See infra Part III.A for signaling effects of successful versus unsuccessful crowdfunding
campaigns.
19 See Christopher W. Cole, Note, Financing an Entrepreneurial Venture: Navigating the
Maze of Corporate, Securities, and Tax Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 473, 482–83 (2009) (discussing
friends-and-family investments). Although it is true that friends-and-family money can show
the entrepreneur has “skin in the game” and may work harder for the company’s success.
20 See infra notes 46–49.
21 See id.
22 See infra Part III.B.
23 See id.
24 See infra Part III.C.
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signal real-world demand for its product or service.25 A successful
crowdfunding campaign shows follow-on investors that the
company has a real customer base.26 Crowdfunding can help
democratize entrepreneurship and make it more affordable for
entrepreneurs to pursue their innovations.27
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the economic
literature on signaling: when signaling is important and what
makes a signal effective; why signaling is especially important in
entrepreneurial finance; and what signals angels and VCs relied on
in choosing companies to fund pre-crowdfunding. Part III
introduces crowdfunding as a new signal for angels and VCs to use
in selecting their investments and argues that, despite early
predictions about crowdfunding’s inevitable failure, a successful
crowdfunding campaign can reflect positively on a company to
angels and VCs. Part IV discusses the normative and legal
implications of crowdfunding properly viewed as a positive rather
than a negative signal. Part V concludes.
II. SIGNALING THEORY
Signaling is an important concept in the law-and-economics
literature.28 This Part has three objectives: to discuss (1) why
signals are an important tool in helping to combat information
asymmetry; (2) why extremely high levels of information
asymmetry make signaling paramount in entrepreneurial finance;
and (3) what signals are used in entrepreneurial finance precrowdfunding, as well as the shortcomings of using those signals.

See infra Part III.C.1.
This may not be as true for pure tech companies as it is for consumer product companies.
However, apps and the like will probably have dedicated users. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
27 See infra Part IV.A.
28 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other
Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 101 (2007) (“[T]he law and economics literature
widely cites Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence for the proposition that signaling
opportunities can generate efficiency gains by enabling uninformed parties to distinguish
between higher- and lower-quality counterparties . . .”) (emphasis and citation omitted);
Spence, supra note 6, at 358–59 (explaining how potential employees signal quality by
engaging in costly activities, such as obtaining a degree).
25
26
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A. WHY DO MARKET PARTICIPANTS NEED SIGNALS, AND WHAT MAKES
A SIGNAL EFFECTIVE?

“Insiders know more than outsiders. Both have incentives to
mitigate the asymmetry.”29 This incentive is especially true in
financial transactions when insiders attempt to sell company
securities to outsiders.30 Information asymmetry exists in varying
degrees in financial markets. For the largest and most well-known
blue-chip companies, information asymmetry is remedied in
numerous ways: analysts rate the company’s securities,31 securities
law forces insiders to disclose information about the company,32
newspapers cover the company’s major moves,33 and reputational
concerns influence the company’s actions.34
But information asymmetry persists, especially with lesserknown companies.35 The cost of remedying information asymmetry
can be high: investors must find, process, and verify information.36
Apart from large mutual funds and hedge funds, most investors do
29 Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1889, 1906 (2012).
30 Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 92 (1998) (“[T]he single largest cost that stands between
issuers and investors is the problem of asymmetric information. The issuer knows the quality
of the securities being offered, but the investor does not and cannot easily find out.”)
(emphasis omitted).
31 Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators
argued that selective disclosure to securities analysts is beneficial to the securities markets
because it increases the dissemination and incorporation of information into stock price.”).
32 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674–75 (1984) (arguing that voluntary information
disclosures reduce information costs).
33 See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News:
A Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 646 (2010)
(discussing the connection between releasing false news and short selling).
34 See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L.
REV. 741, 764 (2000) (“Transaction costs in financial markets are low, liquidity high. Parties
interact in continuous relationships governed by reputational considerations.”).
35 Even with the best-known companies, inside information is non-public and thus
unknown to investors. See Manuel A. Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as
Securities Fraud, 54 B.C. L. REV. 645, 649 (2013) (distinguishing between market and insider
information for signaling in corporate finance).
36 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 597, 611 fig. 4 (1984) (displaying the high information costs in acquiring,
processing, and verifying market information).
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not have the time or motivation to process all the information that
is available on a company.37 The behavioral law-and-economics
literature indicates that investors exhibit bounded rationality,
meaning they use shortcuts when making decisions.38 Thus,
investors’ reliance on signals about a company’s quality can be
efficient and useful.
Signals are a proxy for a company’s quality when that quality is
difficult or costly to discern.39 The use of signals in financial markets
is well documented. For example, hiring a top investment bank
when undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) signals a
company’s quality when the company to-date has been privatelyheld and therefore opaque to the market at large.40 Similarly, a
stock buyback by a public company signals to the market that the
company’s managers believe the company’s stock is undervalued.41
37 Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 19 (1994) (“[M]ost investors do not read,
let alone thoroughly analyze, financial statements, prospectuses, or other corporate
disclosures . . . .”).
38 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (“To deal with limited brain power and
time we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.”).
39 See Long, supra note 5, at 645 (“One strategy firms can use to convey information about
attributes that are not easily discernible is signaling. A signal in this context is just a variable
with low measurement costs that observers believe is not independently distributed relative
to variables presenting high measurement costs.”); see also F.H. Buckley, When the Medium
is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 IND. L.J. 493, 526 (1990) (“Signaling
strategies diminish information costs borne by the firm’s investors, and reduce its cost of
capital.”); J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 922 (2003) (“Relying on
signals is a time-honored way to economize on information costs.”).
40 WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 443 (11th ed. 2010) (“Many familiar market
institutions, such as the investment banking firm, can be understood as
market mechanisms for reducing information costs.”); Partnoy, supra note 34, at 773–74 (“To
stem some investor concerns about their reputations, managers generally select one or more
third-party intermediaries (typically investment banks and accounting firms) to assist with
new issues. These intermediaries are willing to stake their reputational capital on their
ability to evaluate a firm and its management, to ensure that managers are not appropriating
(too much) shareholder wealth.”) (citation omitted).
41 See Buckley, supra note 39, at 537–40. Conversely, an equity issuance is usually seen
as a negative signal. See Anton Miglo, Trade-Off, Pecking Order, Signaling, and Market
Timing Models, in CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS: THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 171, 179 (2011) (“A negative share price reaction on the
announcement of equity issues is usually consistent with empirical evidence”); see also Jeff
Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 412–18 (2003) (discussing the
signaling function of convertible debt).
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For a signal to be effective, it must be both observable and costly.
Signals work precisely because they are easier to discern than
company quality; thus, they must be observable. Enhancing the
salience of a signal increases its effectiveness.42 But the signal must
also be costly.43 If a signal is cheap to send, a bad company can send
it just as easily as a good company.44 Therefore, good companies will
attempt to send signals that are too costly for bad companies to
mimic (e.g., hiring Goldman Sachs to underwrite their IPO).45
B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE

Information asymmetry is extremely high in entrepreneurial
finance. Brand new companies have no track record or established
product or service for investors to rely on; oftentimes, these
companies are just an idea, prototype, or product in its infancy.46
Barriers to entry may be low, meaning the entrepreneur’s idea—
even if proven—may be doomed by a competitor’s first-mover
advantage.47 Scientific uncertainty and complexity in technologybased innovations adds to the information asymmetry between the

42 Utset, supra note 35, at 668 (“Message magnification is one way to increase the salience
of messages. The more salient a signal, the more likely that investors will incorporate it into
their decision making.”) (citations omitted).
43 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2000) (“Signals reveal type if only the good
types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone knows this.”).
44 Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 66
DUKE L.J. 673, 687 (2016) (“Signaling will fail to eliminate the information-asymmetry
problem, however, if a seller’s claim of high quality is not completely credible.”).
45 Utset, supra note 35, at 653 (“Good companies will . . . try to identify expensive signals—
courses of action that are too costly for bad companies to undertake. If one exists, they will
incur the cost of sending the signal, with the expectation that the bad companies will not
follow suit . . . .”) (citations omitted).
46 See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076–77 (2003) (“Precisely because the portfolio company
is at an early stage, uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified. Virtually all of
the important decisions bearing on the company’s success remain to be made, and most of the
significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company’s efforts remain
unresolved.”); id. at 1076 (“The special character of venture capital contracting is shaped by
the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies presents [information
asymmetry] in an extreme form.”).
47 Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover Advantage: A
Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 J. MARKETING 33, 33 (1992)
(discussing the link between order of entry into market and market share).
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startup’s management and potential investors.48 Angels and VCs
must navigate this treacherous terrain to choose among the
thousands of new companies seeking their funding.49 Traditionally,
these investors have decided which companies to invest through
networks, contracts, and signals.50
Angels, and to a lesser extent VCs, rely on networks to sort
among potential investments. Networks work in traditional
angel/VC investing because of the tight geographic proximity
between entrepreneur and investor.51 Both angels and VCs have
long preferred to invest locally, often within a short drive of
themselves.52 For their deal flow, angels rely on a “network of
trusted” advisers including business associates, accountants, and
lawyers.53 VCs likewise prefer to invest in entrepreneurs with whom
they know and feel comfortable.54 Networks are therefore an

48 See id. at 1077 (“[T]he technology base of the portfolio company’s business exacerbates
the general uncertainty by adding scientific uncertainty.”).
49 For example, in 1997, leading Silicon Valley VC Benchmark Partners funded only nine
of the 1500 business plans submitted to them. RANDALL E. STROSS, EBOYS: THE TRUE STORY
OF THE SIX TALL MEN WHO BACKED EBAY, WEBVAN, AND OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS
24 (2000).
50 As discussed later, one of the main ways in which investors in public companies mitigate
information asymmetries—disclosure—is not required in offerings to angels and VCs. See
infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
51 See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 561 (“Venture capitalists (VCs) and
angel investors have long valued close networks and personal relationships when selecting
which entrepreneurs to fund, and they closely monitor their investments in person after they
fund.”). See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (describing intimate Silicon Valley
culture).
52 See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE CAP. 101,
112 (1999) (explaining that angels live close to their investments); see also Venture Support
Systems Project: Angel Investors, MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR. 32 table 3.2 (2000),
http://nutsandbolts.mit.edu/resources/angelreport.pdf (“Most active angels will not invest in
opportunities outside a 1-2 hour driving range.”).
53 Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1432; see also Stephen Prowse, Angel
Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 785, 789 (1998) (“The
primary criterion that angels use to screen proposals is whether the entrepreneur is
previously known and trusted by them or by an associate who they trust.”).
54 See Alex Iskold, 8 Things You Need to Know About Raising Venture Capital,
ENTREPRENEUR
(July
15,
2015),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/248377
[https://perma.cc/C7RA-MCSG] (explaining that VCs feel more comfortable considering
investing in someone who is somehow connected to them).
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effective tool for reducing information asymmetry.55 However, as
the Internet reduces the necessity of geographic proximity,
networks diminish in their utility. Entrepreneurs no longer have to
move to Silicon Valley to seek funding—they can do so over the
Internet.56
The second way in which VCs, and to a lesser extent angels,57
mitigate information asymmetry is through the use of detailed
investment contracts. The typical VC investment contract includes
many protective provisions. The most important of these for
reducing information asymmetry is the practice of “staged
financing,”58 or financing the company in stages instead of all at
once. By allowing investors to gather more concrete evidence about
the company between each stage of financing, staged financing
reduces information asymmetry directly. Importantly, if the
evidence portends bad outcomes, VCs have the option to abandon
the investment altogether.59 As discussed in the next section, staged
financing also reduces information asymmetry indirectly, through
signals.

55 See Eugenia Macchiavello, Peer-to-Peer Lending and the “Democratization” of Credit
Markets: Another Financial Innovation Puzzling Regulators, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 521, 577
(2015) (“[T]he use of social networks backed by financial commitments in the form of early
financing has appeared a determinant of a campaign success as well as a mechanism to
reduce information asymmetries.” (citation omitted)).
56 See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 564 (“As startups need less money
to ramp up, and because it is cheaper and more efficient to raise money online than in person,
startups will likely raise an increasingly large percentage of funds over the Internet.”)
(citations omitted).
57 The more organized, “professional” angel groups may mirror the VC’s investment
contract, while “traditional” angel investors who operate more loosely rely primarily on
networks to screen their investments. See Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1446
(“[A]ngel group investment contracts bear a closer resemblance to venture capital contracts
than to traditional angel contracts, albeit without some of the venture capitalist’s bells and
whistles.”).
58 See Gilson, supra note 46, at 1073 (“The initial venture capital investment usually will
be insufficient to fund the portfolio company’s entire business plan. Accordingly, investment
will be ‘staged.’ A particular investment round will provide only the capital the business plan
projects as necessary to achieve specified milestones set out in the business plan.”).
59 Id. at 1081 (“By accepting a contractual structure that imposes significant penalties if
the entrepreneur fails to [meet] specified milestones based on the business plan’s
projections—the venture capital fund’s option to abandon then becomes exercisable—the
entrepreneur makes those projections credible.”).
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C. SIGNALS USED IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE PRECROWDFUNDING

Angels and VCs also rely on signals to mitigate information
asymmetry when screening potential investments.60 VCs and angels
generally have three signals to assess a potential investment: (1)
the identity of the company’s early investors, (2) the investment
contracts the VCs inked with entrepreneurs, and (3) the company’s
patenting activity.61 Unfortunately, there are problems with relying
on these signals for ex ante investment selection.
The first signal, looking at who has already funded the company,
can certainly be credible. Prominent individual angels, such as
LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman and professional angel groups like
Silicon Valley’s Band of Angels, are likely to have their choice of top
investments. Therefore, companies funded by these angels send a
credible signal of high quality to VCs who may follow.62 However,
not all companies can attract the attention of a prominent angel or
investment group. Absent these investors, startups can rely on
friends and family, but these investors do not send the same signal

60 Note an important distinction: this Article is not discussing the signals that investors
in crowdfunding campaigns themselves might use when selecting among startups seeking
crowdfunding funds. See Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 955, 959 (2015) (stating that information asymmetries
between investors and entrepreneurs are “even more pronounced in an equity crowdfunding
context . . . because small investors are less likely to have experience evaluating investment
opportunities”); see also Ethan Mollick & Alicia Robb, Democratizing Innovation and Capital
Access: The Role of Crowdfunding, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV. 72, 74 (2016) (“While a lot is known
about the signals VCs look for when funding a venture, we know much less about how the
crowd decides what to fund.”).
61 See Darian Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 749–
50 (2010) [hereinafter Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley] (noting that private VCs send signals
regarding which start-ups they fund and that VCs look to the start-ups’ patents and
investment contract).
62 See J.W. Verret, Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century Corporate
Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communications, 41 J. CORP. L. 927,
934 (2016) (“Information problems not resolved by intermediaries could be resolved by the
signal of an initial anchor investor. For example, seed funding from a venture capital (VC)
could be a vitally important initial signal for crowdfunded entities. This way crowdfunders
could free ride on the initial investment of diligence by the VC.”).
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of quality as angels and VCs because they will support the startup
for reasons other than an eventual return.63
Another pre-crowdfunding signifier of a high-quality company is
said to be the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept certain contract
terms. Accepting staged financing from VCs, with more funding
contingent on the next milestone, is thought to signal an
entrepreneur’s confidence in reaching that milestone.64 “Bad”
entrepreneurs will not be confident of their ability to reach the
milestones and will want all funding upfront.65 The same is true of
granting VCs “preferred stock” as opposed to granting the
entrepreneur common stock.66 Because a VC’s preferred stock will
get paid on sale or liquidation before the common stock receives any
payout, an entrepreneur who accepts “inferior” common stock is
thought to signal their belief that the value of the startup will be
more than the VC’s preferences.67
The problem is that contract-based signals are not particularly
credible.68 Given how difficult it is to achieve VC financing, an
entrepreneur who is offered several million dollars to grow their
venture will probably agree to almost any contractual terms. This
is certainly not true of all entrepreneurs. For instance, “serial”
entrepreneurs on their third or fourth successful venture will have
far more leverage69 and likely have the financial resources to hire
63 JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 213 (John Paul Riquelme
ed., W.W. Norton 2007) (1916) (“Whatever else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of a world
a mother's love is not.”).
64 See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 56 (Ashgate
ed., 2001) (“The prospect of an initially small investment keyed to a performance milestone
will tend to deter an entrepreneur from approaching a VC with a low quality business and
exaggerating its prospects.”).
65 See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751 (“When entrepreneurs agree
to delay future funding until reaching certain benchmarks, it sends a signal that this is a
high-quality entrepreneur who believes these benchmarks will be reached.”).
66 See Gilson, supra note 46, at 1072 (“The venture capital fund’s equity investments in
portfolio companies typically take the form of convertible preferred stock.”).
67 See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751–52 (discussing the signals
that entrepreneurs send by selling preferred stock to private VCs while holding common
stocks themselves).
68 See id. at 752 (stating that signals based on investment contracts have questionable
credibility).
69 See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 315 n.130 (2013)
(“[T]he culture of Silicon Valley lionizes the serial entrepreneur.”); see also John F. Coyle &
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an attorney to negotiate.70 But for the vast majority of first-time
entrepreneurs seeking their first VC funding, agreeing to staged
financing and preferred stock is simply the price of attracting a VC’s
investment.71
VCs have also looked to a startup’s patenting activity as a
marker of potential success.72 The argument is that new companies
with more patents are, all other things equal, better investments.
However, intellectual property experts have now seemed to coalesce
around the idea that a startup’s patents have, at best, limited
signaling value. Patents do signal that an entrepreneur is
“disciplined in [her] engineering approach”73 and not lazy.74 Patents
also signal that a new company is of the rapid-growth variety, as
opposed to a lifestyle firm.75
But patents do not necessarily signal market dominance in the
patented technology. Ronald Mann has observed that software
patents are often rendered obsolete by rapidly-changing

Joseph M. Green, Startup Lawyering 2.0, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1403, 1426 (2017) (quoting a lawyer
as saying, “A lot of the work we do puts us at risk of not ever getting paid. Sometimes we’ll
assume that risk knowingly, as when a serial entrepreneur has a really hot startup. We’ll run
a tab and count on the funding to come through at some point.”).
70 See Paul Gompers et al., Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship, 96 J. Fin. Econ.
18, 19 (“[E]ntrepreneurs with a track record of success can more easily attract suppliers of
capital, labor, goods and services if suppliers believe there is performance persistence. A
knack for choosing the right industry-year in which to start a company generates additional
subsequent excess performance if, as a result, the entrepreneur can line up higher quality
resources for his next venture.”).
71 See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751–52 (noting that most
entrepreneurs would not reject staged financing or preferred stock, as both are difficult to
obtain).
72 Long, supra note 5, at 646 (“Intellectual property can serve as a signal of less readily
measurable attributes . . . . The quantity and quality of the patents in the portfolio can serve
as a signal of other firm attributes, as can the order in which the firm applies for the
patents.”).
73 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 993 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Long, supra note 5, at 654
(“Nobody associates obtaining patents with sloth and shiftlessness.”).
74 Mann, supra note 73, at 994 (patents “reflect[] something positive about the ability of
the management team to focus and execute” and “nothing about the uniqueness of the
technology or the firm’s ability to ex[c]lude competitors”).
75 Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1191 (2010)
(discussing interviews with venture lenders who revealed that “a start-up that has IP signals
itself as a rapid-growth company as opposed to a lifestyle firm”).
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technology,76 and that it is difficult to patent an entire software
product or understand what is exactly covered.77 Consequently, in
software at least, the very decision to obtain a patent—as opposed
to continuing product development and consumer testing—reveals
an entrepreneur who focuses on the wrong priorities.78 Thus,
patents, if even available as a signal, may send mixed messages to
potential investors.79
For the reasons above, the signals on which angels and VCs have
traditionally relied turn out to be of limited use in ex ante
investment selection. But information asymmetry between
entrepreneurs and investors still exists in the extreme, and
signaling will be as important as ever for new companies seeking
investors. All of which leads to this Article’s main argument: for new
companies that plan to seek angel or VC funding down the road,
completing a successful crowdfunding campaign is a new and
positive signal an entrepreneur can send about her company’s high
quality.
III. CROWDFUNDING AS A NEW SIGNAL OF HIGH QUALITY
This Part will introduce the existence of a crowdfunding
campaign as a new signal of firm quality. As previously discussed,
effective signals must be both costly and observable.80
Crowdfunding is costly not only because entrepreneurs are granting
investors a piece of their company, but because undertaking a
crowdfunding campaign requires significant disclosure and
76 See Mann, supra note 73, at 979 (“[T]echnology tends to develop so rapidly that by the
time a patent is issued—and the formal right to exclusivity commences—the technology may
be obsolete.”).
77 See id. (“[I]t is difficult to patent an entire product in the software industry because any
particular product is likely to include dozens if not hundreds of separate technological
ideas.”); id. (observing “the difficulty of being sure that a competing product infringes a
patent”).
78 See id. at 982 (emphasizing that “attention to patents can be damaging to a startup
because it has the potential to divert limited time and resources from . . . a highly timepressured effort to develop a product and convince customers and investors of its worth before
the firm runs out of capital resources”).
79 See id. at 980–81 (“The general theme . . . is that there are many factors that play into
the ability of a startup firm to obtain funding and success and that intellectual property has
a low place on the list of factors, if it appears on that list at all.”).
80 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
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associated costs.81 Further, crowdfunding is costly in the sense that
failure may doom a nascent company from the outset.
Crowdfunding is also salient: a company that crowdfunds will be
listed on a funding portal’s website, file forms with the SEC, and
may be featured in newspaper or online articles. Given that
crowdfunding campaigns should send credible signals to the
market, the question remains: are these signals all bad, as currently
intimated, or are they positive?
A. SUCCESSFUL VS. UNSUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGNS

First, we must distinguish between crowdfunding campaigns
that raise the desired funds and those that do not. A company’s
failure to raise the desired funds in a crowdfunding campaign sends
a negative signal to follow-on investors because it demonstrates a
lack of market interest in the company’s product. Therefore, it will
be important to empirically track what percentage of crowdfunding
campaigns are successful. The rarer a successful crowdfunding
campaign is, on average, the stronger a positive signal success
would send. But that positive signal must be strong enough that it
attracts follow-on investment; otherwise, companies will not accept
the risk of an unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign.
The success of a campaign can be found by calculating the ratio,
S, between the amount raised, a, and the amount desired, d. This
formula is expressed below:
S = a/d
When S ≥ 1, the campaign is successful. When S < 1, the
campaign has not been successful.82
81 See Houman B. Shadab, Henry Manne and Nonpublic Company Disclosure, 12 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 361, 368 (2016) (“Crowdfunding companies must file Form C containing
extensive disclosures, including about issuer’s business, its capital structure, how its
securities were valued, and a narrative of its financial condition.”); Samuel G. Wieczorek,
Regulation Crowdfunding: A Viable Option for the Franchising Industry?, 36 FRANCHISE L.J.
275, 283 (2016) (complying with Regulation CF “would, in all likelihood, entail hiring legal
counsel to assist in completing the offering disclosure statement . . . and in many cases engage
an independent accountant to prepare either reviewed or audited financial statements”).
82 This assumes an all-or-nothing campaign. It is also possible that, with greater
experience, investors may require some multiple of the amount raised to the amount desired,
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The success rate of a series of campaigns can be found by
calculating the ratio, R, between the number of successful
campaigns, Sn, and the total number of campaigns, n. This formula
is expressed below:
R = Sn/n
When R = 1, all campaigns have been successful. There is an
inverse correlation between R and the likelihood of a stronger
positive signal from successful campaigns.
B. CROWDFUNDING AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL

Early commentary has argued that a company who chooses to
seek crowdfunding sends a negative signal. Some legal academics
that have addressed crowdfunding and its implementing law,
Regulation CF, have suggested that raising money through
crowdfunding is a path that only low-quality companies will take.
Michael Dorff, for example, is a vocal critic of crowdfunding. Dorff
observes “[t]he core issue has nothing to do with disclosure: it's that
these investments are going to be terrible.”83 He goes on to opine
that crowdfunding is beyond repair as an idea and should be killed
through “excessive regulation.”84
Others take a more nuanced approach, but remain negative or at
least skeptical of crowdfunding as currently designed. Some call for
more disclosure to combat potential fraud.85 From the other end of

in which case S may need to be higher than 1 to send a positive signal. Conversely, if a
company fails to hit their fundraising target, they may be forced to return investor funds. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 227.304(d), 227.201(g) (2016).
83 Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 496 (2014).
84 Id. at 523.
85 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1767 (2012) (“[The] exemption for crowdfunding should
include some affirmative disclosure requirements. Those disclosures could be less
burdensome than those currently required under Regulation A, but they should still be
sufficiently detailed to provide investors with sufficient information to enable them to make
an informed investment decision.”). Merritt Fox cautions against giving up on disclosure and
relying on proxies including signaling, at least for public issuances of formerly privately held
securities:
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the disclosure spectrum, some complain that what began as a
promising idea has been made unworkable due to overregulation.86
Crowdfunding disclosure is actually robust given the relatively
small amounts of funds sought.87 Disclosure, however, no matter
how robust, can only do so much when companies have limited track
records and rely on unsophisticated investors to read and process
the disclosures.88
Still there are other concerns that the crowd may not choose
investments as wisely as angels with years of experience or as VCs
First, the presence of these information asymmetries can lead to a severe adverseselection problem. This problem will prevent a substantial portion of worthy
offerings from being successfully marketed unless, as an antidote, investors are
made confident that issuers are providing a certain level of credible disclosure at
the time of the offering. A regime relying solely on market-based antidotes to these
problems—signaling, underwriter reputation, and accountant or credit-rating
certification—and backed only by liability for intentional affirmative
misrepresentation is, in many circumstances, not a sufficient solution.
Fox, supra note 44, at 678. See also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman,
Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879,
935–37 (2011) (expressing concerns that crowdfunding will be vulnerable to some of the same
abuses for fraud as under Rule 504).
86 See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1604–05 (2013)
(noting that compromises regarding Regulation CF turned a “regulation-free zone into a quite
heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and any intermediaries that assist
them— so much so that it is difficult for us to see why a rational start-up entrepreneur would
find it appealing to use the [crowdfunding] exemption at all.”) (citation omitted).
87 See Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, infra note 93, at 180 (arguing that
Regulation CF “has largely been viewed as heavily favoring investor protection over capital
formation,” especially regarding disclosure requirements”); Frank Vargas, Jennifer Dasari &
Michael Vargas, Understanding Crowdfunding: The SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules and the
Universe of Public Fund-Raising, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 7 (Dec. 14 2015)
https://businesslawtoday.org/2015/12/understanding-crowdfunding-the-secs-newcrowdfunding-rules-and-the-universe-of-public-fund-raising/ (opining that crowdfunding
requires “[private placement memorandum]”-like disclosures, annual reports and better
quality financials”).
88 See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 594–95 (discussing OMRI BENSHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) in the crowdfunding context); see also C. Steven Bradford,
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 109–110 (2012)
[hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding and Federal Securities Laws] (giving statistics and
noting that “[m]any Americans are not financially literate.”); id. at 112 ( “Since crowdfunding
sites are usually open to the general public, at least some of the people investing in
crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial knowledge required to understand
the risks.”); Vargas, Dasari & Vargas, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing how “[a] start-up simply
would not be wise to take on an army of unsophisticated investors”).
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who select investments as a profession.89 By its very nature, the
crowd cannot provide advice and connections (so-called “valueadded services”90) ex post investment like angels and VCs.91
Others question whether the crowd will be skilled at judging new
business ideas.92 Or that crowdfunding can attract growth
companies that make entrepreneurial legends, or only lifestyle
companies with limited growth potential?93
Others question the tactics companies use in early crowdfunding
efforts, particularly selling certain types of “deferred” securities to
the crowd, when those securities work better in traditional angel/VC
finance when follow-on financing is more certain.94 For example,
John Coyle and Joe Green have argued that the type of security sold
89 Traditional entrepreneurial finance has succeeded in large part due to expert investors.
See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 10, at 1494–96 (explaining that
passive startup investors rely on angel and VC investors to take the lead in screening, due
diligence, and engaging ex post with entrepreneurs).
90 See Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 48 (2015)
(“[C]rowdfunding broaches the topic of unbundling governance rights and value-added
services from capital. Consider, for instance, that startup companies seeking funds from angel
investors and venture capital firms typically also receive ‘value-added’ services in the form of
strategic and management guidance, but crowdfunding essentially uncouples these services
from the transfer of capital itself.”).
91 See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 79 (1998) (talking not about crowdfunding but earlier
efforts at Internet investing, “[i]nvestors may also view the absence of outside expert
involvement in Internet offerings as a negative signal.”).
92 See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 10, at 1493 (noting that
“[w]hile crowd-based wisdom does not seem to be a good fit with startup investing, expertbased investing has a proven track record”).
93 See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 102
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 175 (2016) [hereinafter Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE]
(“[M]any of the startups that choose to pursue crowdfunding as a means of raising capital do
so because they have no other options, and they may still struggle to raise traditional venture
financing down the road.”); Michael Lilly, Exploring the Finer Details of Regulation CF
Crowdfunding, SQUARE 1 BANK 1, 2 (May 4, 2017), https://www.square1bank.com
/insights/exploring-the-finer-details-of-regulation-cf-crowdfunding/ (noting that “[i]f you are
launching a lifestyle business . . . then Reg. CF is a solid option”); see also Nicholas Herdrich,
Just Say No to Crowdfunding, 6 U.P.R. BUS. L.J. 157, 177 (2015) (stating that equity
crowdfunding may give a “[n]egative impression [that the] business [was not] able to secure
traditional funding sources earlier”); Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation:
Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 254 (2015) ( “The end result
would be that crowdfunding would be a signal, whether true or not, of poor quality.”) (citation
omitted). But as this Article has already noted, not all companies that crowdfund will be
lifestyle companies. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text.
94 See infra notes 118–129 and accompanying text.
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in some crowdfunding campaigns—the Simple Agreement for
Future Equity (or “SAFE”)—is anything but safe.95 The SAFE itself
is neither debt nor equity, and converts to actual equity only if the
issuing company either raises a follow-on round of financing or is
sold.96 Since many crowdfunding companies are predicted to be
lifestyle companies that do not seek future funding or a quick sale,
Coyle and Green fear that early investors (especially the
unsophisticated crowd) who buy SAFEs will never see a return on
their investment.97
Still others question whether crowdfunding, by adding numerous
small, unsophisticated investors, 98 will scare off angels and VCs
who might want to make a follow-on investment.99 When prior
investors complicate a company’s voting or capitalization table,
sophisticated investors may take a pass and invest in another
startup.100
The arguments above are all reasons why conducting a
crowdfunding campaign could be (and has been) viewed as a
95 Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 171–74 (arguing that SAFEs
are appropriate for startups coming out of the famous Y-combinator accelerator who go on to
raise additional sums of venture capital, but not well understood and potentially hazardous
for inexperienced startups seeking crowdfunding).
96 See id. at 171–72; see also Wroldsen, supra note 17, at 574 (“SAFEs do not include any
provisions related to fiduciary duties or information rights and expressly state that SAFE
investors are not shareholders of the company.”).
97 Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 175–76 (explaining that nontech startups selling SAFE securities “are less likely to be candidates for VC investment and
more likely to evolve into either lifestyle businesses for the founders . . . or companies that
rely on debt financings (such as bank loans) and reinvested profits to support additional
growth” ).
98 See Hurt, supra note 93, at 242–43 (noting the existence of “amateur” and
unsophisticated investors in crowdfunding).
99 See, e.g., Gregory D. Deschler, Comment, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the
Proposed Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1145,
1184–85 (2014) (“[A] crowd of investors with voting power in securities crowdfunding emits a
warning signal and professional investors who might otherwise have bought into a
crowdfunded company (and thereby provided at least some crowd investors with liquidity)
steer away from such investments.”); Risks, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/investors
(last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (“Venture capitalists are uncomfortable when startups have many
small investors (they don’t like collecting thousands of signatures).”); Vargas, Dasari &
Vargas, supra note 87 (referring to horror stories of some startups’ crowdfunding donors
disrupting a company’s operations, “[a] start-up simply would not be wise to take on an army
of unsophisticated investors for the sake of a few thousand dollars.”); Wieczorek, supra note
81, at 283 (“Another potential downside to issuing crowdfunded securities is the prospect of
hundreds of small investors.”).
100 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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negative signal to follow-on investors. In sum, commenters argue if
a company crowdfunds, the company signals to angels and VCs that
it: a) cannot raise money anywhere else; b) lacks expert investors to
guide it; c) takes advantage of early investors; and d) complicates
the company’s capitalization table. This paper will address these
criticisms and demonstrate that, despite these concerns,
crowdfunding can send positive signals and attract follow-up
funding.
C. CROWDFUNDING AS A POSITIVE SIGNAL

Early commentators have not distinguished between successful
and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns—that is the difference
between companies that the crowd vets and companies that the
crowd approves. Early commentary seems to assume that most
attempts at crowdfunding will be unsuccessful due to unsatisfactory
quality or fraudulent companies employing the medium. And if all
crowdfunding campaigns fail, obviously these concerns have merit.
But if some succeed, a divide—and indeed natural selection
experiment—ensues. Despite the arguments outlined above, this
Article argues that a successful crowdfunding campaign sends a
positive signal of firm quality to follow-on investors.
First, crowdfunding can be used skillfully to demonstrate a realworld demand for a company’s product or service, and subsequently
turn customers into brand advocates. Second, crowdfunding can
“professionalize” a company in ways that traditional
entrepreneurial finance does not. Third, issuing the SAFE security
actually preserves follow-on investment because the SAFE is
redeemable by the company, preventing VCs from having to deal
with numerous small investors and a messy capitalization table.
Finally, given the way that the SAFE functions, crowdfunding
suggests a savvy entrepreneur—one who does not wish to dilute
their own equity stake—rather than a desperate one. These
arguments will now be discussed in turn.
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1. Can Show Real-World Demand for a Company’s Product or
Service.
First, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals real-world
demand for the company’s product or service.101 Conducting a
successful crowdfunding campaign, especially if success becomes
the exception rather than the rule, signals something positive about
the company who successfully entices the crowd to buy in. As one
commentator notes: “[c]rowdfunding platforms can . . . be used for
effective product and service validation.”102 Who invests in
crowdfunding campaigns? For companies selling consumer products
or services, it is likely the company’s customers.103 These customers
use the company’s product or service, like it, and think others will
too. They invest in the company to capture this potential upside.
Anecdotally, I have been told the same is true for smartphone apps
and video games. While the same brand-loyalty argument may not
apply to a highly-technical innovation, some growth companies
dependent on consumers exist in the technology space.104
101 See Mollick & Robb, supra note 60, at 75 (“Crowdfunding serves as an excellent tool for
demonstrating demand, since it shows a willingness to pay for a product.”). See also Fleming
& Sorenson, infra note 137, at 14 (“Venture capitalists can also potentially benefit [from
crowdfunding by] having entrepreneurs eliminate some of the questions around whether a
market exists for their product or service. . . .”); Herdrich, supra note 93, at 169 n.96 (2015)
(“[A] successful crowdsourcing round may be one way to prove to angel or venture funds that
there is a market for a new product.”); Christian Catalin et al., Can Equity Crowdfunding
Democratize Access to Capital and Investment Opportunities?, MIT INNOVATION INITIATIVE
12 (May 2016), https://innovation.mit.edu/assets/MIT_-Equity-Crowdfunding_PolicyBrief.5.16.2016.pdf (“Backers of wildly successful Kickstarter campaigns (like Oculus and
Pebble) not only provide startups the money they need to build prototypes and scale, but also
generate the demand signal that professional investors later rely on when choosing which
ventures to fund.”).
102 Judd Hollas, Why Venture Capitalists Are Turning to Crowdfunding, ENTREPRENEUR
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240984. See also Epi Ludvik Nekaj,
Five Reasons Why Equity Crowdfunding Beats Venture Capital, VIRGIN (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.virgin.com/entrepreneur/five-reasons-why-equity-crowdfunding-beats-venturecapital (“The beauty of crowdfunding is that a community can show support through their
wallets and put their weight behind [an] entrepreneur and an idea.”).
103 See Sunghan Ryu & Young-Gul Kim, A Typology of Crowdfunding Sponsors: Birds of a
Feather Flock Together?, 16 ELEC.COMMERCE RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS 43, 48 (2016)
(noting that the “avid fan” of the product or service being crowdfunded is one of the largest
groups of investors (emphasis removed)); see also Ricarda B. Bouncken et al., Crowdfunding:
The Current State of Research, 14 INT’L BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 407, 411 (2015) (noting that
with a crowdfunding campaign, the company’s “base of potential customers is increased”).
104 For example, Angry Birds started as an iPhone app. See generally Paul Kendall, Angry
Birds: The Story Behind iPhone’s Gaming Phenomenon, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2011, 5:30
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Thus, in the right context, crowdfunding shows follow-on
investors that the company has a real customer base and that there
is demand for its product or service.105 When selecting their
investments, angels and VCs consider whether the company (i)
demonstrates a market for a product or service; and (ii) shows that
it is fulfilling that market demand.106
Further, having individuals not only as customers but as
investors can help to increase the company’s market reach. Those
customers or users, now investors, can become brand advocates for

PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/video-games/8303173/Angry-Birds-the-storybehind-iPhones-gaming-phenomenon.html. Since 2009, Angry Birds has enjoyed substantial
periods of valuation and growth. Jussi Rosendahl & Tuomas Forsell, ‘Angry Birds’ Maker
Rovio Plans IPO to Spur Growth, M&A, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 1:22 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rovio-ipo/angry-birds-maker-rovio-plans-ipo-to-spurgrowth-ma-idUSKCN1BG0HY (“Rovio saw rapid growth after the 2009 launch of the original
‘Angry Birds’ game . . . .”); see also Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 578 (discussing consumer product
growth companies raising funds on Title II site CircleUp).
105 See CROWDFUND CAPITAL ADVISORS, HOW DOES CROWDFUNDING IMPACT JOB CREATION,
COMPANY REVENUE AND PROFESSIONAL INVESTOR INTEREST? 4, 10 (2014),
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/research/ (explaining that crowdfunding has a
marketing benefit that translates into sales); Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of
Crowdfunding, INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 63, 72–73 (2014) (discussing how equity
crowdfunding can benefit the company as a form of market research to predict product
demand); Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS.
VENTURING 1, 3 (2014) (“[F]unding need not be the only goal of a crowdfunding effort . . .
crowdfunding has been used by founders to demonstrate demand for a proposed project,
which can lead to funding from more traditional sources.”); John Beckwith, Predicting Success
in Equity Crowdfunding (Apr. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons), http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1000&context=joseph_wharton_scholars (“[E]quity crowdfunding can serve as a
validation tool to ensure that there is substantial demand for the product, providing a
particularly informative type of market research.”).
106 See Mann, supra note 73, at 976 (“The key is ‘sustainable differentiation’: something
special about the particular firm that will enable it to do something that its competitors will
not be able to do for the immediate future.” (citation omitted)); id. ( “[E]ven before investors
consider whether a firm can protect a market leader position, they will want to know whether
the product is one that customers need so desperately that the firm could earn significant
revenues from sales of the product.”); Ron Miller, Can Crowdfunding and Venture Capital
Coexist?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2016, 9:42 PM) https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2016/03/82466-can-crowdfunding-and-venture-capital-coexist/
(“Equity
crowdfunding
provides a level of feedback that can’t be easily replicated; there is no greater validation than
people investing their hard-earned money into a company’s future. The early market
validation this provides is absolutely critical, a fact that venture capitalists are sure to
appreciate.”).
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the company.107 One article noted the “[s]ignificant number of
owners/brand advocates” as a positive reason to use equity
crowdfunding.108 Funding portals likewise indicate that
crowdfunding can be used to convert customers into brand
advocates.109
In sum, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals both a
demand for a company’s product or service and a company’s capacity
to meet that demand. By turning customers into owners, a
crowdfunding campaign can elevate a company by creating brand
advocates out of users.110 A successful crowdfunding campaign can
advertise or market the company to new users.111
107 Brett Relander, With the Right Incentives Loyal Customers Will Become Brand
Advocates, ENTREPRENEUR (June 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/246579
(discussing that loyal customers can grow a company through referral programs).
108 Herdrich, supra note 93, at 177.
109 See Risks, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/investors (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
(“Most of the fun from investing in startups comes from how you can help them! You can offer
product feedback, introduce founders to relevant people in your network, or evangelize
product launches.”); Title III Equity Crowdfunding on SeedInvest, SEEDINVEST: RAISING
CAPITAL, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/raising-capital/title-iii-equity-crowdfunding (last
visited Sept. 12, 2018) (“By inviting its early adopters to participate in a Reg CF [Regulation
Crowdfunding] offering, a company can help turn users into brand evangelists. Customers
who own stock in a business are more likely to recommend that company to others and
increase the amount they spend with that company. Reg CF gives startups a way to build
deep brand loyalty with their customers, a key driver of growth for early stage companies . .
. . Reg CF is about more than just fundraising. It is an opportunity for a company to make a
marketing splash and create an army of brand ambassadors.”); Why Wefunder?, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/faq/founders (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (“A crowd of investors can help
in ways traditional investors can’t. They are often your most passionate evangelists.”). NonU.S. equity crowdfunding portals make the same indication. See Steven Male, Ultimate Guide
to Marketing Your Equity Crowdfunding Offer, SNOWBALL EFFECT (May 21, 2015),
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/ultimate-guide-to-marketing-your-equitycrowdfunding-offer (“Besides the inevitable value in having a whole new bunch of people
invested in and buying your products, the crowd can also be harnessed to promote products,
leverage skillsets and capabilities that are missing in the company, and provide a credible
source of market feedback and ideas.”); Quarterly Company Progress Report, SNOWBALL
EFFECT (Dec. 2015), https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/companies-update-december-2015
(“[C]ompanies can unlock significant value from shareholders who act as advocates for their
products if they’re mobilised by engaging and regular information.”).
110 See Relander, supra note 107.
111 Victor Fleischer has argued that deal structures, such as Google’s IPO, can advertise or
have a “branding effect” in addition to transmitting information. Victor Fleischer, Brand New
Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006);
see also D. Gordon Smith, The “Branding Effect” of Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189,
196 (2007) (“Though Fleischer refers to this form of advertising as ‘consumer signaling,’ it is
not signaling in the conventional economic sense because it is not aimed at mitigating
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2. Can “Professionalize” the Company.
Conducting a crowdfunding campaign can force an entrepreneur
to “professionalize” the company. The entrepreneur must put
together disclosure, deal terms, and other information in a
professional format, viewable on the Internet. This may not lead to
a stronger product or service, but having to work with attorneys and
accountants and describe what the company is doing can help the
entrepreneur sharpen her strategy and explain it to others.112 A
company willing to bear these costs at an early stage signals to
investors that it is willing to “do it right.”
Selling to friends and family, or even angels and VCs, will not
force the company to do the same legwork. Friends and family likely
invest under Rule 504 (if they are unaccredited) or Rule 506 (if they
are accredited), and neither rule requires disclosure.113 When angels
and VCs invest, they do so under Rule 506, which does not require
disclosure.114 Thus, Regulation CF forces companies to present
themselves professionally in ways that the prior securities law
exemptions do not. 115

information asymmetries”) (citation omitted); id. (“This marketing component of deal
structures is not focused on the transmission of information, but instead on the creation of
meaning.”) (citation omitted).
112 By analogy, Lynn Stout has argued that in large corporations, forcing directors to go
through procedural hurdles (hiring lawyers, bankers, etc.) to meet their duty of care can
actually lead to better substantive decisions. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An
Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 693 (2002).
113 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.506 (2017) (exempting transactions from federal
registration under regulation D); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2017) (stipulating under
Rule 506, no disclosure is required as long as the investors are accredited); cf. Exempted
transactions, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).
114 See C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017) (exempting transactions such as limited offers and sales
from disclosure); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEUR BUS.
L. J. 287, 295 (2012) (“Regulation D offerings overwhelmingly are made under Rule 506. Even
offerings of one million dollars or less—offerings that are suited for Rule 504—are
overwhelmingly made under Rule 506. Similarly, the data show offerings of one million to
five million dollars—offerings that are suited for Rule 505—are also overwhelmingly made
under Rule 506.”); Cable, supra note 9, at 132 (“The exemption from registration that most
startup companies rely on is Rule 506 of Regulation D . . . .”).
115 Additionally, as investors gain more experience with crowdfunding campaigns, the
disclosure requirements could be revised to better address information asymmetry concerns.
See infra Part IV.B.
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As with patenting activity, doing the legwork to run a
crowdfunding campaign signals entrepreneurial discipline and
competence.116 Crowdfunding also enables angels and VCs to
conduct their due diligence more easily than they could on a startup
that has not crowdfunded.117 Thus, crowdfunding helps a company
directly, by making it easier for VCs and angels to invest, and
indirectly, by signaling that the entrepreneur is willing to put in the
work to run a real company.
3. In Defense of SAFEs.
The SAFE security is “a deferred equity investment that will
prove valuable to the holder if, and only if, the company that issues
it raises a subsequent round of financing, is sold, or goes public.” 118
Due to its binary nature (converting to common stock upon a major
event or remaining a SAFE),119 the SAFE is likely to result in a
complete loss of investment for the less successful crowdfunding
companies, and possibly for even moderately successful lifestyle
companies. However, this paper has two responses in defense of
SAFEs.
First, with no resale market for crowdfunding securities on the
horizon,120 common stock or other equity in these same companies
may in practice prove to be equally worthless. In order for
crowdfunding investors to have liquidity in their investment, a

116 See Mollick & Robb, supra note 60, at 75 (“[V]enture capitalists look for preparation as
a signal that entrepreneurs understand the risks and pitfalls of a new business, and have a
plan to overcome obstacles that present themselves.”); see also Younkin & Kashkooli, infra
note 134, at 32 (discussing how crowdfunding sites can “help founders develop a business
plan, practice their pitch, and set appropriate benchmarks for success”).
117 See Hollas, supra note 102 (“Crowdfunding platforms inherently leverage technology to
categorize multiple aspects of the companies seeking capital and present them in a
standardized format that can quickly be reviewed by any potential investor. This allows for
a much quicker due-diligence process than traditional means.”); cf. Mollick & Robb, supra
note 60, at 76 (“[T]he crowd also does a good job performing due diligence on projects . . .
because the crowd, collectively, is wise in spotting fraud.”).
118 Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 172.
119 See id.
120 See Scott Shane, Will Equity Crowdfunding Buyers Be Able to Sell Their Shares?,
ENTREPRENEUR (June 30, 2015) https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247832# (exhibiting
skepticism of a resale market for crowdfunding securities); cf. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding,
supra note 1, at 580 n. 106 (explaining the high minimum value VCs require to invest, which
was around $5.2 million in 2003 (citation omitted)).
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company that crowdfunds will need to attract follow-on investors,
and will need to find an acquirer or undertake an IPO to achieve
liquidity.121 But companies would need to follow these steps with or
without SAFE.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the way SAFEs are
written now encourages angels and VCs to follow a crowdfunding
round. VCs do not like a messy capitalization table, or to “share”
their traditional equity stake with earlier investors.122 Because
SAFEs are not technically equity—and therefore do not add
shareholders to the company whose votes must be procured—nor
debt with looming interest payment obligations, the investments do
not, before conversion, complicate later VC investments.123
At the time of a SAFE’s conversion to equity, two saving graces
help the attractiveness of the investment. First, SAFEs typically
convert into non-voting stock, thus eliminating the voting concerns
that typically come with a number of small investors.124 Even more
importantly, SAFE provisions typically include redemption
clauses.125 These redemption clauses allow companies to
“repurchase the SAFEs of non-accredited investors for the fair
market value of the instrument, as determined by an independent
appraiser of the company’s choosing.”126 Therefore, a VC preferring
a clean capitalization table could simply buy out the SAFE holders
before their SAFEs convert to equity.
Coyle & Green rightly observe that crowdfunding investors “can
be prevented from seeing the bulk of the returns from the most
successful companies they fund.”127 VCs can buy crowdfunding

121 See Shane, supra note 120 (identifying the different methods for start-up companies to
achieve liquidity).
122 See Ibrahim, Angel Investors supra note 11, at 1429 (“A start-up marred by a
complicated angel round is unattractive to venture capitalists because it requires them to
‘unwind’ the non-standard angel preferences in order to strike the venture capitalists’
standard deal.”).
123 See id.
124 Coyle & Green, The Note-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 179 (critiquing the non-voting
nature as leaving crowdfunding investors with SAFEs that convert “at the mercy of the
founders and more sophisticated investors” but observing that these investors “would at least
be owed fiduciary duties by the company’s board of directors”).
125 See id. at 178–79.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 179.
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investors out if larger gains loom for the company. In short, the huge
payoff from correctly picking the next Facebook is no longer there
for the crowdfunding investors; instead, it all belongs to the
entrepreneurs and VCs. If crowdfunding investors become wise to
this practice, then perhaps crowdfunding falls apart.
Perhaps SAFE securities should be rewritten to give
crowdfunding investors a premium on buyout, or factored into the
appraiser’s initial valuation.128 Companies giving redeemed
crowdfunding investors a premium would soften the blow of
redemption. While the investors may lose if a startup does go on to
a public offering, they would win on the other startups that VCs
fund but then ultimately flounder or fail. VCs, of course, may choose
to be generous with SAFE redemptions out of litigation fears and
not concern for crowdfunding’s long-term viability as a matter of
game theory.129
4. Crowdfunding Can Reveal a Savvy Entrepreneur.
Crowdfunding can be a savvy move for entrepreneurs for social
and financial reasons. An entrepreneur seeking initial capital to get
her venture off the ground has a few potential choices:
bootstrapping, asking friends and family, or seeking money from
angels, VCs—and now the crowd. Not all of these choices will be
available to all entrepreneurs.
Bootstrapping is using an entrepreneur’s personal resources to
fund the startup, for example, by putting company expenses on a
credit card.130 As most growth startups fail, bootstrapping these
types of companies is a significant financial risk to an
entrepreneur.131 A Kauffman Foundation study found that the more
128 There is precedent for this. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 466 (1977)
(affirming a circuit court determination that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty when Morgan Stanley valued a company at a $125 per share for minority
shareholders and $150 per share for the majority shareholder).
129 But see Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding's Curious Conundrum, 7
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 415–16 (2012) (discussing the collective action
problem of a number of small shareholders each with a small financial stake having the
motivation or coordination to sue for crowdfunding fraud or other violations).
130 See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 821–22 (2004) (discussing bootstrapping methods).
131 RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH PAD: INSIDE Y COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY'S MOST
EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR STARTUPS 14 (2012) (quoting well-known entrepreneur Paul Graham
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credit card debt a new company incurs, the more likely it is to fail.132
And as explored more below, not all entrepreneurs have access to
personal funds.
Asking friends and family to invest in an entrepreneur’s new
company is a time-honored tradition, but it requires the
entrepreneur to have wealthier friends and family.133 It also comes
with social and financial costs. Socially, there is a risk that the
entrepreneur’s requests are rejected, or that successful requests for
capital put added pressure on the entrepreneur to succeed.134
Financially, selling off common stock to friends and family at a low
valuation, which is typical for a nascent company, dilutes the
entrepreneur’s ownership share.135 If the entrepreneur can hold off
on selling equity until the company is more proven, she can sell
stock at a higher price and suffer less dilution (i.e., retain a greater
ownership stake).
As discussed, crowdfunding campaigns may entail selling SAFE
securities, which do not dilute the entrepreneur at all at the time of
issuance. Thus, crowdfunding can “extend the runway” before the
first actual equity round.136 This enables the entrepreneur to sell
as stating, “If you start a startup, you'll probably fail. Most startups fail. It's the nature of the
business.”).
132 Robert H. Scott III, The Use of Credit Card Debt by New Firms, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION
1 (Aug. 2009) (“[C]redit card debt reduces the likelihood that a new business will survive in
the first three years of operation. The results, which were statistically significant, found that
every $1,000 increase in credit card debt increases the probability a firm will close by 2.2
percent.”).
133 See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of how crowdfunding can reduce inequality between
well-heeled, well-connected entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not enjoy those benefits.
134 Peter Younkin & Keyvan Kashkooli, What Problems Does Crowdfunding Solve?, 58 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 20, 28 (2016) (suggesting that crowdfunding is a preferable alternative to friends
and family because “[f]ounders may be reluctant to ask those most willing to give for the fear
of the social cost of being denied or of the project failing”).
135 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 74 (1965)
(discussing how new issuances dilute existing shareholders). Sometimes friends and family
receive convertible notes or SAFEs instead of common stock. In such cases, the dilution
argument that follows is inapplicable.
136 This is what venture debt does for venture capital. See Ibrahim, Debt as Venture
Capital, supra note 75, at 1196 (“A start-up that can continue to grow and achieve milestones
using debt receives a higher valuation when more equity is eventually sold. A higher
valuation means that existing shareholders do not have to sell as much of the firm to raise
the needed funds. Therefore, venture debt ‘enables the company to buy an additional six-totwelve months of time so that they are able to get a much better valuation in their next
financing round.’”) (citations omitted).
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higher-priced equity later, which dilutes her ownership stake less
than an early equity round would. Even with non-SAFE issuances,
crowdfunding allows the entrepreneur to separate the traditional
bundling of funds and value-added services. As I have observed, “the
inherent passivity of [Regulation CF] investors—a seeming
negative—would actually appeal to entrepreneurs who wish to
unbundle the cash and value-added service components of
traditional entrepreneurial finance. In obtaining only cash from
investors, these startups could also obtain a better price for their
shares . . . .” 137
IV. NORMATIVE AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
This Article has argued that, for many reasons, companies
completing a successful crowdfunding campaign send a positive
signal of firm quality to follow-on investors. This final Part
addresses some normative and legal implications that flow from this
argument.
A. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: OPENING OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE
ENTREPRENEURS

First, not all entrepreneurs have access to other sources of initial
capital.138 This may be especially true for women and minority
entrepreneurs, who have been historically underrepresented.139
137 Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 590 (citation omitted); see also Lee
Fleming & Olav Sorenson, Financing by and for the Masses: An Introduction to the Special
Issue on Crowdfunding, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 13 (2016) (noting that “[f]rom the perspective
of the entrepreneur . . . large allocations of equity to the venture capitalist often represent a
cost that they would rather avoid[,]” making crowdfunding an attractive first step).
138 See Andrew Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 621 (2015) (“The
traditional first source for entrepreneurial financing is from the entrepreneur’s friends and
family, as well as their own personal savings. Most people, however, have negligible personal
savings, and the same can be said of their friends, so it comes down to whether the
entrepreneur has a wealthy relative.”) (citation omitted); Thomas Murphy, Note, Playing to
a New Crowd: How Congress Could Break the Startup Status Quo by Raising the Cap on the
Jobs Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption, 58 B.C. L. REV. 775, 779 (2017) (lamenting “the
exclusive social dynamics in the venture capital market, where the strength of an
entrepreneur’s network is often as important as the strength of his or her idea”).
139 See Murphy, supra note 138, at 787 (“Evidence further suggests that women and
minorities are disproportionately ignored by traditional forms of startup financing.”); Susan
R. Jones, Jacqueline Lainez, & Debbie Lovinsky, Viewing Value Creation by Business Lawyers
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Perhaps they do not have well-heeled friends and family who can
fund their business venture.140 Maybe they do not have the assets
or income necessary to obtain a credit card with a high limit, and
therefore cannot bootstrap.141 Crowdfunding shows signs of being
more ethnically and gender diverse than traditional
entrepreneurship. One commentator notes that over twenty percent
of crowdfunded companies have “at least one female founder”
compared to only eight percent of VC funded companies with
“female founders.”142 Thus, crowdfunding may be a necessity for
some entrepreneurs seeking early-stage capital.
Even for those entrepreneurs that can obtain friends-and- family
money, a “capital gap” may persist in terms of next funds needed,
but it still being too early for professional investors to consider
coming in.143 And the capital gap may be substantial.144
Angels can fill this capital gap to some extent, as angels invest
smaller amounts and are active in more geographic regions than
VCs.145 But geographic discrepancy exists even in the angel
Through the Lens of Transactional Legal Clinics, 15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 49, 95 (2014) (“In
addition to limited access to capital, minority entrepreneurs may not meet bank credit
approval criteria.”).
140 See Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding:
Solving the SME Funding Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 347, 356 (2016) (“‘[C]rowdfunding’ enables entrepreneurs who traditionally face
financing constraints to obtain capital from anyone in the world via the Internet.”) (citation
omitted).
141 Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885,
948–49 (2018).
142 See Bradford, Crowdfunding and Federal Securities Laws, supra note 88, at 103–04
(“Crowdfunding makes new sources of capital available to small businesses. It opens business
investment to smaller investors who have not traditionally participated in private securities
offerings. Those investors have less money to invest, so they would be willing to fund smaller
business opportunities that the venture capitalists and angel investors would not touch.
Crowdfunding also gives poorer entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to
provide seed capital somewhere else to turn.”).
143 See Cable, supra note 4, at 108 (describing the “funding gap” that exists after an
entrepreneur’s personal/family resources run out and before VCs will invest).
144 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time To Allow General Solicitation
and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“Estimates indicate,
however, that financial markets fall short by some $60 billion annually in meeting the
demand of small companies for early-stage private equity financing. This unmet need is
referred to as the funding gap.”) (citations omitted).
145 Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1418 (“Angels fill the funding gap as to both
time and capital, functioning as a ‘conveyor belt’ that moves young start-ups toward waiting
venture capitalists.”) (citation omitted).
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community. If an entrepreneur is not proximate to angels or VCs in
Silicon Valley, Austin, or New York, for example, she is unlikely to
get funded.146 Crowdfunding, while not the panacea of freeing “the
geographic constraint that has long hindered entrepreneurship in
rural areas,” has shown “modest” success in funding companies in
“states that are largely off the radar of traditional VCs and angel
investors, such as Idaho, New Mexico and South Carolina.”147
If a successful crowdfunding campaign serves as a positive signal
to follow-on investors, then traditionally disadvantaged
entrepreneurs will be on par with—or even above—the well-heeled
entrepreneurs who raised initial capital from friends and family. In
other words, if angels and VCs view successful crowdfunding
campaigns as a positive signal, then a successful crowdfunding
campaign will not disadvantage an entrepreneur who cannot avail
herself of bootstrapping or friends-and-family capital. This
argument supports crowdfunding proponents’ initial plan to
“democratize” startup investing.148
B. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: CROWDFUNDING CAN REDUCE
INFORMATIONAL LOCK-IN

A successful crowdfunding campaign (as opposed to investment
from friends, family, early angels or seed-stage VCs) can also
mitigate “informational lock-in.”149 Informational lock-in occurs
when early investors enjoy informational advantages about the
company when it comes to pricing and participating in its follow-on
146 See Schwartz, supra note 143, at 622 (“[T]here is tremendous competition for [angel and
VC] investments and such investors are interested in certain types of companies, often in
limited geographic areas. Importantly, angels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making
it difficult to get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with such investors or
their acquaintances.”) (citation omitted); Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at
731 (discussing instances of entrepreneurs moving to Silicon Valley because they could not
obtain funding in their prior locations).
147 Schwartz, supra note 141, at 947–48; see also id. at 948 (“In the end, although it
obviously has not transformed Bismarck into Boston, or Pine Bluff into Palo Alto,
crowdfunding has in fact achieved some real amount of geographic inclusivity.”).
148 See Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011); see also
Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 662 (2016)
(“Inclusivity is core to the nature of crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising.”).
149 Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders?
Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1104, 1105 (2012).
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rounds.150 Early investors can use this informational advantage to
sell themselves cheap equity in follow-rounds and thereby dilute
the founder’s share of the company more than it would otherwise be
diluted through arms-length fundraising.151
A successful crowdfunding campaign combats the informational
lock-in problem by substituting the crowd for the early investor with
the informational advantage. The crowd, by definition, as a large
and dispersed group, will not be able to employ informational lockin to its advantage due to collective action problems. Thus, by
turning to the crowd instead of other early investors, founders can
prevent dilution of their shares of the company not only by issuing
SAFEs, but also by obtaining better pricing in follow-on rounds.
C. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS CAN REDUCE
NEED FOR DISCLOSURE

If the costs of raising capital through Regulation CF are high,152
due in part to legal costs,153 then perhaps we can determine what
types of disclosures actually are useful in reducing information
asymmetry and hone Regulation CF’s requirements accordingly. As
it currently stands, Regulation CF requires significant disclosure
for small companies.154 Is it the risk factors that potential investors
care about? The company-specific business plan descriptions? The

150 See id. (noting that informational lock-in occurs “when information asymmetry between
a firm’s existing investors and potential outside investors make it difficult to obtain
competitive financing”). Although this informational lock-in is typically an issue in the
banking context, Broughman & Fried observed it may occur in subsequent VC financing
rounds. Id. at 1107.
151 See id. (discussing that informational lock-in “enable[s] the existing investors to extract
rents in subsequent financings”).
152 See Lou Bevilacqua, How Much Does It Cost to Raise Money Through Equity
Crowdfunding?, BEVILACQUA PLLC (Sept. 26, 2016), http://bevilacquapllc.com/much-costraise-money-equity-crowdfunding/ (estimating an “all-in” cost from $60,000 to $150,000 for a
$1,000,000 equity crowdfunding offering).
153 See id. (estimating these legal costs between $3,000 and $20,000); see also Thompson &
Langevoort, supra note 86, at 1605 (noting that Title III imposes “a quite heavy and costly
set of responsibilities on . . . issuers”).
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1) (2016) (requiring disclosure of, among other things, the
issuer’s name and physical address; the website of the issuer; the names of directors and
officers; a description of the issuer’s business plan; a description of the issuer’s financial
situation; and a description of the issuer’s ownership and capital structure).

2018]

CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS

231

financials?155 We must also distinguish here between disclosure that
is useful to investors in the crowdfunding campaign itself and those
disclosures that are useful to follow-on investors. Perhaps the
disclosures overlap, but maybe they do not.
One new study examines the signaling effect of “hard” and “soft”
information disclosed by a company attempting to raise capital from
the crowd.156 Hard information includes items such as “age,
financial condition of the issuer” and “executive team size.”157 Soft
information, on the other hand, includes an “issuer’s social capital”
and “responsiveness to prospective investors on the crowdfunding
platform.”158 The study finds that hard information has no or
limited value to potential investors,159 while soft information
(particularly a strong social media following) sends a strong positive
signal of company quality.160
I am not aware of any studies examining angels’ or VCs’ use of
crowdfunding disclosures in making their own investment
decisions.161 Should mandatory disclosures of hard information
prove of limited value to professional investors, as perhaps they are
to the crowd, then the SEC may be able to limit disclosures of hard
information in crowdfunding campaigns without negative effects.
This would make crowdfunding a cheaper option to more
entrepreneurs seeking funding.

155 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(2) (2017) (requiring that an issuer must have an
independent public accountant review the financial statements for target offering amounts
that total between $107,000 and $535,000 based on sales for the preceding twelve months); §
227.201(t)(3) (requiring that an independent public accountant audit financial statements for
offerings exceeding $535,000 in sales for the previous twelve months, unless dealing with a
first-time issuer, who need only provide financial statements previously audited by an
independent public accountant if available or statements previously reviewed by such
accountant).
156 Anzhela Knyazeva & Vladimir I. Ivanov, Soft and Hard Information and Signal
Extraction in Securities Crowdfunding (Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051380.
157 Id. at 12.
158 Id. at 16–17.
159 Id. at 26 (“Hard information about issuer quality based on current accounting
characteristics and past track record has limited relation to offering success.”).
160 Id. at 28 (“[S]ocial media following is significantly positively related to both offering
success and offering proceeds.”).
161 But see Part III.C.3. (arguing that forcing companies to put together the disclosure
serves another purpose—professionalizing the company).
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The signaling/disclosure relationship is complicated. Angels and
VCs use contracts, networks, and signals when sorting among
potential investments.162 Angels and VCs may or may not get any
formal disclosure, as the law does not require it.163 Thus, with
disclosure historically playing a smaller role in angel/VC selection,
contracts being of limited sorting utility, and networks diminishing
in importance with the pervasiveness of the Internet, signals take
on added importance. The signal sent by a successful crowdfunding
campaign should top the list of signals that angels and VCs rely on
going forward.
Although signaling cannot completely replace disclosure in
combating information asymmetry,164 perhaps it can play a larger
role in the relative balance in further amendments to Regulation
CF. Crowdfunding must be affordable for entrepreneurs to be able
to use it, and current estimates suggest its costs can be excessive.165
Crowdfunding signals may reduce the need for some disclosure, and
should the SEC reduce the amount of disclosure required, the cost
of conducting a crowdfunding campaign would likewise drop.
V. CONCLUSION
There is evidence that angels and VCs are using crowdfunding
as a new source of deal flow.166 As one commentator states: “Given
162 See supra Part II.B. (showing angels and VCs use contracts, networks, and signal when
sorting potential investors).
163 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. But see STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 587 (Foundation Press, 4th ed.., 2015) (“The
requirements of the securities laws aside, most sophisticated investors in the private
placement market will simply avoid offerings that lack a private placement memorandum”).
164 See generally Fox, supra note 44, at 687.
165 See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2012) (“Can this new regulatory-laden exemption be
useful to small entrepreneurs? It is difficult to imagine that for offerings under $250,000
either issuers or intermediaries would be willing to undertake the time, cost and risk of
potential liabilities.”); Seth A. Orangeburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for
Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 437 (2015) (“Raising money by
selling stock costs at least $25,000 in legal fees. Therefore, it would be irrational to raise less
than $25,000 by selling stock in all instances.”) (citation omitted).
166 See CROWDFUND CAPITAL ADVISORS, supra note 105, at 11 (“There is a consistent refrain
that professional investors will not want to work with companies that have received
crowdfunding investments. The data from this study suggest the exact opposite . . . . Several
founders remarked that they received calls from angel groups that had not even allowed them
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the fact that more startups and small businesses are launching
crowdfunding campaigns, it’s no wonder that many venture capital
firms are turning to crowdfunding platforms to access new deal
flow.”167 Angels and VCs’ increased reliance on crowdfunded
companies suggests that early predictions about crowdfunding as a
fund-raising tool of last resort are incorrect. Indeed, as this Article
has argued, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals a
company’s high quality to follow-on investors. Through its signaling
function, crowdfunding can democratize entrepreneurship and
make it more affordable. Meaning there is hope, still, that
Regulation CF may live up to its initial promise.

to pitch, and were receiving term sheets from [the angel groups]. These findings indicate that
angels and venture capital groups may look to entrepreneurs to prove their ability to execute
and fundraise from the crowd prior to investing. Doing so may [de-risk] their investment if
they can see an entrepreneur has traction from the crowd.”).
167 Hollas, supra note 102.

